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The Private Offering Under Rule 144
and Proposed Rule 146: New Armor
for an Old Warrior
NICK G. KALOKATHIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The scheme of federal legislation pertaining to sales of securi-
ties has created certain well-worn pockets of ambiguity. When
coupled with the pervasive scope of the regulatory scheme, even
ordinary sales seemingly isolated become a potential trap for the
unwary. One of these obstacles is the non-public offering exemp-
tion, a concept involving much more than the name implies.'
With the adoption of Rule 144,2 and the release of its compli-
ment, proposed Rule 146,3 the uncertainties involving the applica-
tion of the private offering exemption have been greatly ameli-
orated. No longer will it be necessary to grapple with the elusive
concepts of investment intent or change of circumstances. 4 The
transformation of the private offering exemption from formerly
* B.S., 1960, J.D., 1963, University of Wyoming, LL.M., 1970, George-
town University, Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
1. 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 653 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as Loss].
2. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1972).
3. 37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972); See SEC Securities Act Release No.
5336 (Nov. 28, 1972).
4. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL AD-
MINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE 33 AND 34 ACTS, 160 (1969) [hereinafter
cited at WHEAT REP]. See also Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461
(2d Cir. 1959); Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6,
1962).
subjective esoterica into objective lineage is the subject of this pa-
per.
The Wheat Report contributed the essential stimulus to this
end and furnished the sustaining power to the rather lengthly rule
making process from which Rule 144 emanated. 5 Even though
prior versions had undergone extensive revision, in its final form,
Rule 144 adopts the fundamental premise propounded by the Re-
port. That premise recognizes an operative relationship between
the registration requirements of the Exchange Act of 19346 and the
disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. 7 This results in the
availability of Rule 144 to those issuers who have complied with
the Exchange Act reporting requirements.8
In contrast, proposed Rule 146 is of more recent vintage, de-
veloped out of the Commission's concern for the preservation of
the classic means of obtaining venture capital.9 Although inde-
pendent in operation and scope, Rule 146 assumes a crucial posi-
tion as a necessary compliment to Rule 144. Before becoming
enmeshed in the specific details, a quick overview of the private
offering exemption would be instructive.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION
A. The Legislative Setting
In view of the scant legislative history of the private offering
exemption,10 the story is best told by one of the principal drafts-
men of the final version of the Securities Act of 1933.11 To such
draftsmen, the first attempt to regulate securities at the national
level required a choice between two basic approaches.
One approach would require the registration of the securities
themselves before they could be sold freely. The second would re-
quire registration of the offering being distributed and conceivably
would include offerings by non-controlling shareholders. The first
approach involved a practice common to all blue sky legislation of
that time, and because of general dissatisfaction, it was rejected.
The second approach recognized the practical difficulty that non-
controlling shareholders would face if required to force the issu-
er's compliance with registration. This result being undesirable,
the legislative proposal specifically exempted non-controlling
shareholders. Once it was decided that sales by non-controlling
5. WHEAT REP., supra note 4.
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12, 13, 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78 1, m, o
(1972). Sowards, The Wheat Report and Reform of Federal Securities
Regulation, 23 VAND. L. REv. 495, 497 (1969).
7. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1970).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12, 13, 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78 1, m, o
(1970).
9. 1 Loss, supra note 1, at 653.
10. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
11. Id. at 37.
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shareholders should not be regulated, a scheme of selective lim-
ited regulation began to unfold.
Consistent with this philosophy was the recognition that the
sale of securities to a limited group of sophisticated investors
should not concern the federal government. Thus, the Securities




Several years after the enactment of the Securities Act, the
Commission's General Counsel issued an interpretive release out
of concern for the undesirable and increasing tendency of large
issuers to resort to the private offering exemption as a means of
raising capital.'8 It was necessary to serve warning that many of
such placements would be in jeopardy and require registration.
Even though this early opinion was issued after only limited ex-
perience with the operation of the securities law, it remains re-
markably viable.14  Of immediate pertinence was the General
Counsel's understanding that "the determination of what consti-
tutes a public offering is essentially a question of fact in which all
surrounding circumstances are of moment."" The approach de-
fined the basic texture of the private offering exemption. By
necessity that approach required an appreciation of the fundamen-
tal subjective parameters which underlie the private offering ex-
emption. As in most areas in which the resolution of status de-
pends upon the implication of subjective criteria, a predictable
degree of uncertainty soon develops from which conflicting inter-
pretations emerge. The private offering exemption was not des-
tined to avoid this curse. Despite the lingering uncertainty, some
20 years elapsed before the Supreme Court ruled,16 but any an-
ticipation that the Court would offer a clear, workable definition
was unfounded. In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. an offering to
"key employees"' 7 was deemed to fall beyond the scope of the pri-
vate offering exemption despite the issuers' attempt to limit the
class of offerees. First, the notion that an offering to a few per-
sons assures the availability of the private offering exemption, was
12. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
13. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
14. But see SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1972).
15. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 at 1 (Jan. 24, 1935).
16. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
17. Id. Ralston Purina's idea of key employees included "artist, bake-
shop foreman, chow loading foreman, clerical assistant, copywriter, elec-
trician, stock clerk. .. ." Id. at 121.
laid to rest. The Court stated that "the statute would seem to
apply to a 'public offering' whether to few or to many."'I s More-
over: (1) the offerees must have access to the type of informa-
tion which a registration statement would disclose; (2) the of-
ferees must be able to fend for themselves in matters of invest-
ment.19
More recently the Fifth Circuit has decided two private offer-
ing cases which are receiving wide notoriety.20 There is concern
that these decisions create impossible proof burdens, the conse-
quences of which would tend to dry up the classical sources of
"seed" capital required to finance new ventures. To negate this
possibility and provide more specific direction, the Commission has
recently proposed Rule 146.
C. The Nature of the Private Offering
To understand the practical ramifications created by the per-
sistent uncertainties which plague the private offering exemption,
reference should be made to section 12(1) of the 1933 Act. 21 Sec-
tion 12(1) provides a private right of action to the buyer of un-
registered securities.22  The plaintiff need only allege and prove a
sale of unregistered securities by means of mails or interstate
means. The seller's intent, or his knowledge of the registration
violation is irrelevant. Conversely, the buyer's knowledge and ap-
preciation of the investment risks, without more, is also immater-
ial. The only defense is an affirmative one-proof of the avail-
ability of an exemption, in this case the private offering exemp-
tion.23 As the requirements necessary to establish the availability
of the private offering exemption become more obscure, the greater
the plaintiff's chance of success in a private action under section
12(1). Accordingly compliance-more essentially proof of compli-
ance 24-transforms a seemingly mechanical task into a precarious
venture. Thus suits for rescission against the issuer should be con-
sidered to be a realistic possibility and their defense laced with
18. Id. at 125.
19. Id. at 127.
20. Hill York v. American Int'l. Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th
Cir. 1971) (Finding of a public offering with thirteen sophisticated offerees).
SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) (Finding of
a public offering because no affirmative proof that all offerees had full
access to additional information).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77 1 (1) (1970).
22. III Loss, supra note 1, at 1692.
23. Proof of the availability of the non-public offering was considered
to comprise at least two major elements as suggested by Ralston Purina:
(1) Are the offerees in need of the protection accorded by registration,
and (2) Do they have access to the kind of information contained in a
registration statement to allow them to fend for themselves. The fact that
the offering was limited numerically was not material. Katz v. Amos
Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1053-54 (2d Cir. 1969). See generally Orrick,
Non-public Offerings of Corporate Securities-Limitations on the Exemption
under the Federal Securities Act, 21 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1959).
24. Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
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uncertainty if a proposed venture financed through a non-public
offering should turn sour. Obviously such uncertainty would only
discourage an issuer from tapping an important source of venture
capital.
The problems created by the uncertainty of application of the
private offering do not stop with the real possibility of a private
suit under section 12. They create an atmosphere which nurtures
opinion shopping. There are instances which require the opinion
of counsel regarding the status of a transaction under the Securi-
ties Laws. 25 Astute and knowledgeable counsel often hesitate to
render a favorable opinion because of their appreciation for the
ambiguous character of the non-public offering. But for those
companies so inclined, there are others with a superficial under-
standing of the securities laws, ready and willing to render an
opinion. This obviously undesirable practice should be discour-
aged.
Adding to this turmoil are two recent cases containing lan-
guage which emphasized with even greater clarity, the uncertain-
ties surrounding the private offering exemption. The major issue
in both was whether the issuer had successfully sustained its
burden of proving the availability of the exemption. Hill York v.
American International Franchises, Inc.26 undoubtedly was dis-
posed of properly on the ground that the private offerees were
given materially deficient information during the course of the is-
suer's sales activity. The salient feature of the case was the fact
that the offers were limited to thirteen persons, all of whom were
sophisticated in business matters. In practice, it was not at all
unusual to view the non-public offering in terms of two practical
parameters-quantity limitation and sophistication of the offer-
ees.27 Hill York demonstrates once again the persistent and en-
during proposition that quantity limitations alone will not insu-
late a securities transaction from the federal regulatory scheme.
Unlike Hill York, the material disclosed in SEC v. Continental
Tobacco Co.28 was not deficient. However, the private offering was
25. PLI FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 61 (R.
Mundheim, A. Fleischer, and D. Glazer, eds., 1970); PLI GoING PUBLIC:
FILING PROBLEMS 35 (A. Levenson, ed., 1970); W.M. Kennedy, The Case of
the Scarlet Letter or The Easy Way Out on "Private Offerings," 23 Bus.
LAw 23 (1967).
26. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
27. These parameters find no support as valid criteria, yet their influ-
ence as "planning guidelines" prompted SEC Securities Act Release No.
4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). See also I Loss, supra note 1, at 654, 662, 664; Mulford,
Private Placements and Intrastate Offerings of Securities, 13 Bus. LAw
297 (1958).
28. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
not available because the issuer failed to affirmatively prove that
all offerees of its securities had access to additional information
which they might have requested in order to verify for them-
selves the statements made to them as an inducement to pur-
chase.
29
While the requirement of access to the information is a well-
established principle, the duty to provide access for verification is
something new. In effect this requirement means that sales
activities must be limited to persons having what amounts to an
insider relationship with the issuer. By necessity the issuer's rec-
ords would have to remain open for inspection for the purposes of
verification. That the specific nature of this duty is not particu-
larly well-defined, can be attributed to its ambiguous origins. But
a discussion of this matter is reserved until later.
III. PRoPosEr RULE 146
After repeated attempts3 0 by the financial community aimed
at convincing the Commission to adopt numerical criteria as a
means of delineating the bounds of the private offering, the goal is
now in sight. The invitation to the Commission to adopt such cri-
teria was extended by the Supreme Court in Ralston Purina,3 1
but the SEC has been consistent in its refusal.' 2 Now pro-
posed Rule 146 recognizes that offerings, if limited to 35 pur-
chasers in any consecutive twelve month period, may qualify for
the private offering exemption if other specific conditions are
met
3 '
Besides extending recognition to the numerical test, the pro-
posed rule contains another unprecedented feature-a quantity
limitation with respect to purchasers only, not offerees.3 4 This is
contrary to all of the leading authorities which consistently have
deemed the number of sales immaterial and that inquiry should
focus upon offers.35 In contrast, under the proposed rule, it is pos-
29. Id. at 161.
30. See Proposed SEC Rule 181, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5012
(Oct. 9, 1969); Comment, 74 DICK L. REv. 422, 434 (1970). However,
Proposed Rule 181 never became effective because it was displaced by Rule
145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1972).
31. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
32. See note 27 supra.
33. Proposed SEC Rule 146(f), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26141 (1972);
see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972). Rule 146(f)
reads in part:
There shall not be more than thirty-five persons in any consecutive
12-month period who purchase securities of the issuer in transac-
tions pursuant to this section, or not pursuant to this rule but
otherwise in reliance on section 4(2) of the Act; provided however,
there shall be excluded in determining such number any person
who purchases securities from the issuer for cash in an amount
not less than $250,000.
34. Id.
35. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). Loss observes
that "[i]n so far as numbers are of any consequence, . . . the important
criterion is the number of offerees." 1 Loss, supra note 1, at 653.
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sible to extend offers to unlimited numbers, provided sales are
limited to thirty-five.3 6
The former proposition, that the status of a proposed non-
public offering is to be judged by the number of offers extended,
rather than upon the number of sales consummated, has not been
without its critics. Obviously it presents a trap for the unwary.
7
It is irrational to permit rescission by allowing the purchaser to
point to the character of other offers when such other offers were
never accepted. The inquiry should focus upon the quality of dis-
closure to the instant offeree and the ability of the offeree to ap-
preciate its contents.38 There is, however, an overriding consid-
eration, and that involves the principle that when an offering
assumes public dimensions it is the legitimate concern of govern-
ment to insure the quality of those offerings. Although the offers
are not accepted, nevertheless, regulation of such offers is neces-
sary in order to preserve a healthy atmosphere in which investor
confidence may flourish. Proposed Rule 146 preserves this notion
without expressing outward concern over the number of offers
made. It does so by announcing a series of stiff conditions within
which such offers must be confined. Most of these conditions are
well-known and accepted.
A. Advertising-Promotional Meetings
Since advertising is inconsistent with the concept of the non-
public offering, its use is prohibited as a means of attracting
prospective purchasers3 9 It does not appear whether the tomb-
stone ad is to be considered general advertising. However, in view
of the special circumstances under which the tombstone ad finds
application, 40 it appears as though the use of this method falls
within the category prohibited.
Moreover, promotional meetings are outlawed, doubtless as a
result of Continental Tobacco. 41 A humorous aspect of that
case dealt with a specific episode where meetings were held
for the purpose of selling stock to a limited audience. During the
36. The proposed rule, however, would not count toward the thirty-
five person limitation those sales which are in excess of $250,000. Proposed
SEC Rule 146 (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26141 (1972); see note 33 supra.
37. R. Victor and M. Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the
Unwary, 45 VA. L. REV. 869 (1959).
38. Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963).
39. Proposed SEC Rule 146c(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140 (1972),
accord, Hill York v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th
Cir. 1971).
40. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1970); see
SEC Rule 134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1972).
41. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
course of one meeting, the person conducting it was interrupted
on several occasions by long distance phone calls. Upon returning
from one such call, he reported that Gloria Swanson had just re-
ordered a carton of the revolutionary super low tar cigarette "Ven-
ture," the primary product of Continental Tobacco. This scheme
no doubt, was borrowed from a page of well-known land promo-
tion chicanery. In the typical promotional meeting the potential
for fraud is rife. Even though the literature and content of the
oral statement may be free from misrepresentations, nevertheless
members of a group, albeit small in number, are vulnerable to
subtle techniques calculated to induce "quick money fever" of the
group variety. Phonies posing as respectable members of the com-
munity may be part of this select number, chosen to be given the
"exclusive opportunity" to buy into the once-in-a-lifetime deal.
Of course any favorable buy reaction from the phony plant, once
having gained the confidence of the innocent lambs, can bring
favorable results to the promoter. That the above scheme in-
volves criminal law and indeed securities law problems is unde-
niable. However, proof is difficult. Accordingly, by confining
sales activity within the "negotiated transaction," as the rule pro-
poses, the above scenario would be neutralized.
B. Negotiated Transaction
The term is defined as:
[A] transaction in which securities are offered and the
terms and arrangements relating to any sale of securities
are arrived at through direct communications between the
issuer or any person acting on its behalf and the pur-
chaser or his investment representative.
42
Direct communication implies personal conduct or communication
that provides an opportunity to ask questions and receive an-
swers.41 While this requirement minimizes the chances for group
pressure, the requirement of close direct personal contact is the
basic ingredient of the confidence game. If the prophylactic qual-
ities of the rule were to stop here, there would be room for con-
cern. But there are more.
C. Nature of Offerees-Ability to Bear Risks
The authorities have been consistent in requiring that the of-
ferees possess the degree of sophistication to be able to appreciate
the nature of the risks being offered.44 The proposed rule adopts
42. Proposed SEC Rule 146(a) (3), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140 (1972).
43. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28, 1972).
44. This might be an overstatement. See PLI FirST ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTE ON SEcuwImEs REGULATION at 40 n.32 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer and
D. Glazer, eds., 1970), where the following observation is made:
Some cases seem to suggest that the purchasers must be
sophisticated, i.e. able to "fend for themselves" and have access to
the kind of information which registration would disclose. See
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678
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this notion. In addition it introduces a new requirement: issuers
must have reasonable grounds to believe that the offeree is able
to bear the economic risks of the investment. 45 This additional
requirement is unique to the non-public offering, indeed unique to
the basic scheme of federal regulation envisioned by Congress.
The Securities Act never did purport to concern itself with the fi-
nancial status of the purchaser, or even the issuer. Although there
were early attempts to require the federal government to pass
judgment upon the investment character of the security, these
efforts were never incorporated into the law.46 As long as the
issuer fully disclosed his business history and present status, the
investor could not find comfort in the federal regulatory scheme
for his mistaken investment judgment.
The Commission has departed from this entrenched philosophy
by requiring that the offerees be able to bear the economic risks
of investment. To support this requirement the Commission quotes
the famous passage from Ralston Purina: "An offering to those
who are shown to fend for themselves is a transaction not involv-
ing any public offering. ' '47 But the above passage fails to support
the Commission's position because it was quoted out of context.
A sentence, from Ralston Purina preceding the above quote is re-
vealing: "The design of the statute is to protect investors by pro-
moting full disclosure of information thought necessary to in-
formed investment decisions. ' 48 Accordingly, when Ralston Pu-
rina speaks about "fending" it means that the information given to
an offeree must be of the quality normally required in a registra-
tion statement.
48
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); D. F. Bernheimer &
Co., 41 S.E.C. 358, 363 (1963). Others suggest that, if the purchasers
are in fact sophisticated, it is sufficient if they are in a position to
receive all information relevant to making a fully informed decision.
See Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. I 91,523
at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1965). A third interpretation is sug-
gested in Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Colo.
1965) (suggests that purchasers must either be given information
which a registration statement would make available or that they
be "'sophisticated"). The Commission apparently disagrees. See
Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962): "The exemption
does not become available simply because offerees are voluntarily
furnished information about the issuer. Such a construction would
give each issuer the choice of registering or making its own
voluntary disclosures without regard to the standards and sanctions
of the Act."
45. Proposed SEC Rule 146(d) (2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140 (1972).
46. 1 Loss, supra note 1, at 123-28.
47. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 at 7 (Nov. 28, 1972).
48. 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
49. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962) wherein
it is observed that the act of furnishing the appropriate information cannot
be used in lieu of registration.
The inability of one to fend because of lack of sufficient dis-
closure is quite distinct from one's ability to absorb the economic
risks of a bad investment. Because the Commission has confused
these two concepts, the validity of the requirement concerning
economic ability proposed by Rule 146 is in doubt.
That the Commission by rule may announce the terms and
conditions under which it will refrain from exercising its enforce-
ment powers is not denied. Accordingly compliance with pro-
posed Rule 146 would serve as insurance against Commission ac-
tion. However, federal agency rulings are not controlling upon the
courts to the extent that interpretative provisions are inconsistent
with the pronouncements of case law.50
The possibility of being confronted with this apparent para-
dox provides no reason to cast criticism against the Commission.
Because the requirement of economic ability exceeds the criteria
announced in Ralston Purina, any private offerings complying
with proposed Rule 146 would become not only invulnerable to
Commission challenge, but also impervious to attack through a
private action.
D. Proof Requirements
Before any offers may be extended, there must be reasonable
ground leading to the belief that the offeree has knowledge and
experience in business and financial matters and is capable of
evaluating the economic risks in view of the information pre-
sented.
51
The burden of proving that such grounds exist rests with the
offeror. If the negotiated transaction requirement was not enough
to limit the scope of sales activity, the proof requirement will pro-
vide the practical denouement. It should be emphasized that this
latter requirement extends to all offerees regardless of whether
they eventually buy.
In order to produce evidence of significant quality to sustain
the burden of establishing reasonable grounds, communication
with prospective buyers is obviously required. However, any action
tending to arouse investor interest, although falling short of an
offer under the law of contracts, is deemed, nevertheless, to be an
offer within the meaning of the Securities Act. Thus communi-
cation with a prospective offeree to determine the degree of
sophistication and ability to assume the economic risks could eas-
ily be construed as an offer. 2 Fortunately the Commission has
perceived this dilemma and has provided that inquiry to verify be-
lief of reasonable ground is not in and of itself an offer.5 3 It
50. I. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958).
51. Proposed SEC Rule 146(d) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140 (1972).
In addition the offeror must have reason to believe that the offeree is
capable of assuming the economic risks. Id. at (d) (2), 37 Fed. Reg. at
26140.
52. In re Loeb, 38 SEC 843 (1959).
53. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 at 7 (Nov. 28, 1972).
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should be emphasized, however, that the scope of this preliminary
inquiry for verification is not without limits and communication
unrelated to this verification may be construed as an offer.
E. Offeree's Access to Information-Verification
A further provision of the rule requires that during the nego-
tiated transaction, the offeree not only be given information of
the character required in a registration statement, but also access
to any additional information necessary to verify such informa-
tion. The latter requirement of access for verification raises in-
triguing questions.
This theory of verification can be traced to a recent Tenth Cir-
cuit case, Lively v. Hirschfeld," which involved a private action
under Section 12." The issue was whether defendant sufficiently
sustained his burden of proving the availability of the non-public
offering exemption. The Tenth Circuit cited Ralston Purina for
the proposition that offerees must be in a position to have "regu-
lar access to all the information and records which would show the
potential for the corporation."5 6  The Fifth Circuit thereafter
took the cue and in Continental Tobacco stated the test more ex-
plicitly by noting that: "None of the purchasers had any actual
opportunity to inspect Continental's records or to verify for them-
selves statements made to them as inducements for the pur-
chases."95 7
Without commenting upon the substantive merits of this ver-
ification requirement, it should be pointed out this requirement is
of dubious derivation. The Tenth Circuit's view of the Ralston
Purina case is not correct. Ralston Purina did not require access
to the raw data for verification in addition to the requirement of
full disclosure. Quite the contrary, and quoting from the opinion:
We agree that some employee offerings may come
within § 4 (1), [now 4 (2) ], e.g., one made to executive
personnel who because of their position have access to the
same kind of information that the Act would make avail-
able in the form of a registration statement.58
The foregoing means that insider status is tantamount to full dis-
closure. It does not mean that full disclosure requires access for
verification. Thus, access to insure complete disclosure is quite
consistent, indeed demanded by Ralston Purina. But, access for
54. 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
55. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
56. 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971).
57. 463 F.2d 137, 158 (5th Cir. 1972).
58. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953).
verification is another matter.59
Despite the dubious origins of the verification requirement, the
Commission should not be criticized for attempting to impose con-
trols over the essential atmosphere of the private offering. How-
ever, adherence to this requirement might create more problems
than it purports to solve. Can the issuer assume that only those
records requested by an offeree need be presented? In Lively v.
Hirschfeld the court seemed unimpressed by the fact that because
the purchaser did not request information for the purpose of ver:
ification, none was made available.0 Since the character of
this duty has not yet fully developed, it can only present un-
foreseen obstacles until the Commission takes steps to further
clarify its ramifications. There is one case, however, in which the
duty to verify assumed a dominant role. In Escott v. Barchris
Construction Corp.,61 the failure to verify the accuracy of the reg-
istration statement defeated the availability of the due diligence
defense. It would be unfortunate to impose by analogy the duty
of care necessitated by Barchris into the verification requirement
announced in Rule 146. Both derive from different generic origins.
Neither involve analogous situations.
The duty regarding verification under Rule 146 is more akin to
an open door policy by the issuer with respect to the prospective
shareholder. It would appear to be enough if the issuer extended
insider status to the offerees sometime during the course of the
negotiated transaction.
F. Restrictions on Disposition
The Securities Act defines "underwriter" as one who pur-
chases "with a view to . . . distribution. '6 2 Should a purchaser
taking securities privately from an issuer or underwriter decide
to resell, such purchaser would be deemed an underwriter if the
securities were initially purchased with a view to distribution, and
not with a view toward investment. The consequences of taking
with a view to distribution would subject not only the resale to
the registration requirements of the Securities Act, but also the
initial attempt at private placement.
6 3
59. In SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 at 1 (Nov. 6, 1962) the
Commission stated that: "The courts' concept [of the non-public offering]
exemption is necessarily narrow." The Release never mentioned anything
akin to a duty to provide access for verification. This concept first appeared
in the proposed Rule 145 proceedings.
60. 440 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1971).
61. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
63. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 0, 1962) states that:
An important factor to be considered is whether the securities
offered have come to rest in the hands of the initial informed
group or whether the purchasers are merely conduits for a wider
distribution. Persons who act in this capacity, whether or not
engaged in the securities business, are deemed to be "underwriters"
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. If purchasers
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In order to discourage such resales, proposed Rule 146 imposes
three conditions:
1. Placing a legend on the certificate indicating that they
were not registered and cannot be transferred without registration
or an available exemption.
2. Issuance of stop-transfer instructions to the transfer agent,
if any, or an appropriate notation in the issuer's records, if the is-
suer transfers its own securities.
3. Obtaining a written agreement from the purchaser that
the security will not be resold without registration or other com-
pliance with the Act.6 4
The proposed rule, however, rejects the more classical lan-
guage used in typical investment letters and perhaps for good
reason. Such language included affirmations to the effect that
the purchaser takes with a view toward investment and not to
distribution. These self-serving statements are nothing but empty
conclusions and of little value unless supported by consistent ac-
tion. 5
Of considerable significance is the length of time that a secur-
ity is held.6 The longer the holding period, the stronger the like-
lihood that such security was purchased with a view toward in-
vestment, but the holding period is not conclusive proof of invest-
ment intent. However, such evidence is highly persuasive. To
be sure, if the duration of the holding period is relatively short,
those statements typically contained in investment letters are vir-
tually worthless as proof of intent, for the courts are more inter-
ested in conduct than representations.6 7 Moreover, the length of
the holding period is a more substantial need than the self-serving
statements embodied in investment letters. It is for these reasons
that proposed Rule 146 requires compliance with the above re-
quirements. The operative effect of Rule 146 ends at this point.
Criteria dealing with the length of time that a security must be
do in fact acquire the securities with a view to public distribution,
the seller assumes the risk of possible violation of the registration
requirements of the Act and consequent civil liabilities.
Id. at 2.
64. Proposed SEC Rule 146(f) (2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26141 (1972).
65. WHEAT REP., supra note 4, at 171. See also SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
66. WHEAT REP., supra note 4, at 164.
67. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959). In
Gilligan the following representation in the face of inconsistent action was
of little value:
I hereby confirm to you that said debentures are being purchased
for investment and that I have no present intention of distributing
the same.
Id. at 465.
held in order to avoid liability under the Securities laws, is a sub-
ject reserved for Rule 144.
IV. REQUMENTS FOR RE-SALE-RLE 144
A. Historical Development-Investment Intent and Change of
Circumstances
Unfortunately, the judiciary has been unable to supply ob-
jective guidelines delineating the moment at which a buyer is
transformed into an investor. Moreover, the Commission has
been unwilling to officially designate such an interval. Unoffi-
cially, the staff has been willing to accept a two year holding pe-
riod as circumstantial evidence of investment intent. But, periods
of from three to seven years have not been uncommon.
68
Relief from this state of uncertainty could be obtained by re-
questing a no-action letter. This ad hoc procedure was used when-
ever a clash with the interpretation of Section 2(11) was foresee-
able. However, this episodic approach proved to be inadequate.
Moreover after In re Ira Haupt & Co.69 the brokerage community's
feeling of vulnerability reached a peak. Consequently, it demanded
and received a more complete and institutionalized format. 0 It
was this format, Rule 154, which served as a rough model for
Rule 144.
Ira Haupt involved a situation in which a broker was execut-
ing sell orders on behalf of a control party. The argument that
the broker's exemption applied was rejected and violations of the
Securities Act were found because the selling activities fell within
the precise statutory definition of "underwriter." The brokerage
community feared that an innocent, routine execution of custo-
mers' sell orders, even for limited amounts, would create an unwar-
ranted burden with insignificant results in terms of investor pro-
tection. Moreover, an otherwise innocent broker could inadver-
tently become a statutory underwriter if he were unwittingly in-
volved in a distribution scheme in which multiple parallel selling
channels were used. In such cases the broker being engaged in an
otherwise innocuous sale, and believing the transaction to be an
isolated one, would have little reason to think of himself as a
statutory underwriter, even though other sale activity, unknown to
the broker, created a "distribution" within the meaning of the Se-
curities Act. To remove these nagging fears and provide admin-
istrative relief to the brokers, Rule 154 came into being.71 It con-
68. Lowenfels, SEC "No Action" Letters: Some Problems and Sug-
gested Approaches, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1256 (1971).
69. 23 SEC 589 (1946).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1951) rescinded, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972). See also Clark, SEC Regulation of Resale of
Securities by Controlling Persons of Non-reporting Issues: The Ghost of
Ira Haupt Reads the "Wheat Report" and Rule 144, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 576
(1971).
71. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3421 (Jan. 21, 1951), amended,
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3525 (Dec. 22, 1954).
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tained two fundamental points. It first introduced the concept
of defining a distribution in terms of a quantity limitation.
72 It
next imposed upon the broker a duty to investigate the source
and context of the particular transaction as a condition to the
availability of the relief provided by Rule 154.73 However, there
was one irrational limitation; it applied only to sales on behalf of
control parties and would not apply to sales on behalf of issu-
ers.7 4 Rule 154 remained operational for several years with a high
degree of success, but rather than attempt to expand the scope of
Rule 154, a more complete solution to the private exemption was
sought and this triggered an intensive study of the problem within
a much broader framework with emphasis upon disclosure.
Amid this background the Wheat Report emerged, recognizing
the urgent need for the development of workable objective stand-
ards upon which a practitioner could rely with confidence. It in-
sisted that a solution would have to be consistent with good dis-
closure policy.Y' Accordingly, the report quickly recognized the
possibility of using the reporting requirements of the Exchange
Act of 193476 as a means of providing to prospective purchasers
enough information to allow them to fend for themselves. In addi-
tion, if such information were kept current by quarterly filings,
the major pitfalls associated with the private offering would di-
minish. Of course such filing would be on record only in the
National Office of the SEC in Washington, D.C., with no require-
ment for the delivery of a prospectus. Consequently, the requisite
information would not be available to prospective investors un-
less specifically requested.
77
But the major contribution of the Report was not only the
recognition of the 1934 Act disclosure possibilities, but also its
quest for objective standards which would transform the concept
of investment intent into a workable framework. Before embark-
ing on its course, the Report questioned the status of two firmly
embedded but highly dubious parameters-the technique of in-
vestment letters and the change of circumstances doctrine.
Because of the near impossibility of proving investment in-
tent, the practice of soliciting investment letters from buyers be-
72. See note 82 infra for the specific terms of this limitation as applied
by Rule 144.
73. See note 82 infra.
74. WHET REP., supra note 4, at 185.
75. Id. at 178-84.
76. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12, 13, 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78 1, m, o
(1970).
77. Sowards, The Wheat Report and Reform of Federal Securities
Regulation, 23 VAND. L. Rrv. 495, 500-01 (1969).
dame popular. indeed, such practice attained the status of dogma.
But the investment letter provided little solace to the party relying
upon it if the buyer chose to ignore its terms and conditions.
For this reason the Report summarily dismissed the effectiveness
of investment letters and declared them to be of "dubious magic."
The study found their use as a means of promoting a policy of
disclosure to the public investor to be of little practical value.78
Not only are the once worshipped mystical qualities of the
investment letter deflated, but also the report lays to rest any
optimism that might have been brewing on behalf of the change of
circumstances doctrine. It does so by posing an illuminating para-
dox: Assume A purchases 50,000 shares and B purchases 5,000
shares from the same issuer. A had encountered a "change of cir-
cumstances" so that he may now sell without registration. B,
however, does not enjoy sufficient change of circumstances so that
B must register.7 9 Why, the report wonders, is A's change of cir-
cumstances relevant to the public investors' need to know. A bet-
ter rationale must be advanced on behalf of the private offering.
To that end, the report suggests three alternatives, rejecting two
and adopting one.
The first approach would involve a retention of the test of
investment intent for purposes of defining the underwriter status.
To provide some certainty, the limited brokerage transaction simi-
lar to the provisions of Rule 154 would be adopted with a three-
year holding period. However, only those issuers who have en-
joyed gross revenues exceeding a minimum figure of several thou-
sand dollars would be allowed to take advantage of the holding
period, thereby preventing the parking of securities in dormant
companies for the three-year period. This approach was rejected
because it ignored the availability of information already required
by the 1934 Act.80
A second approach required registration of all public resales of
securities but would rely principally upon the Commissioners'
power to specify the content of the registration statement de-
pending upon the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
Thus, the disclosure criteria would be far from uniform and
would vary between the two extremes of the comprehensive S-1
form for nonreporting issuers and the one page prospectus for or-
dinary brokerage transactions. This was rejected due to the mas-
sive administrative burden without a clear benefit to the public.8
The third approach was the one adopted. It distinguished be-
tween reporting and non-reporting companies, and based on this
distinction offered an extensive and objective definition of the
term "distribution" under Section 2(11) of the Securities Act.
78. WHEAT REP., supra note 4, at 166-72,
79. Id. at 168.
80. Id. at 179.
81. Id. at 180.
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Thus, the status of those parties falling within the purview of the
elusive term "underwriter" would be determined easily and effi-
ciently by the newly proposed objective criteria for the term "dis-
tribution." The "leakage" approach of Rule 154 used to define the
"distribution" would be adopted but the scope of the new defini-
tion would not be limited, as in Rule 154, to resales by control par-
ties.8 2 With this fundamental purpose in mind the Report an-
nounced the specifics of its proposed rules to accomplish that
end.
While the reappraisal of the SEC's administrative policies in-
volved a minimum amount of equivocation, the transition from
theory to the working rule provided a rougher course. After one
false start (known as the 160 series),ss the Commission finally
adopted Rule 144. The basic objection to the 160 series was not so
much its substance, but rather its overly complex format. Rule
144 represents an attempt to simplify the first proposal, series 160;
it appears that this noble aim was fulfilled.
B. Rule 144
Restricted Securities
Rule 144 adopts as its central theme the concept of "restricted
securities," a notion embodied in its Rule 160 series predecessor,
but appearing nowhere in the Securities Act. The term "restricted
securities" means: "Securities acquired directly or indirectly from
the issuer thereof, or from an affiliate of such issuer in a transac-
tion or chain of transactions not involving any public offering."
8 4
Besides clothing the concept of restricted securities with admin-
istrative dignity, the above definition fixes the scope of Rule 144.
For example, it does not apply to securities acquired from a re-
organization, nor stock acquired as a dividend. 5 On the other
hand, Rule 144 applies to securities acquired directly from an is-
suer, which effectively broadens the premise upon which former
Rule 154 was based.
82. The leakage provisions are embodied in Rule 144(e) 1, 2, 17
C.F.R. 230.144(e) 1, 2 (1972). Another concept borrowed from Rule 154
is the broker's transaction which is now found in Rule 144(g), 17 C.F.R.
231.144(g) (1972). But see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5307 (Sept. 26,
1972) for a recent change to Rule 144(g) (2).
It has been suggested that adherence to the broker's transaction re-
quires compliance with the standards of inquiry announced in SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5168 (July 7, 1971). PLI THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 54 (R. Mundheim and A. Fleischer, eds., 1972).
83. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969).
84. SEC Rule 144(a) (3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a) (3) (1972).
85, PLI THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcURITiEs REGULATION 14 (R.
Exclusiveness
The earlier versions of Rule 144 created a fair amount of con-
cern over whether the rule would be the exclusive device available
for the disposition of restricted securities. 86 If the application of
Rule 144 were to be deemed exclusive, then all selling practices
would fall within its rigid purview, and rather than being wel-
comed for its relief from subjective uncertainty, it would be cursed
for its inflexibility. In the final version of Rule 144, the Commis-
sion takes the position that the rule is not exclusive, but warns
those brave enough to venture without it to proceed at their own
risk.87 Accordingly, close attention to the details of Rule 144 is
necessary, with an analysis of those issuers who may qualify being
a logical starting point.
Qualified Issuers
In keeping with the approach suggested by the Wheat Report,
Rule 144 distinguishes between reporting and non-reporting com-
panies by limiting its application to the former."" However, cer-
tain nonreporting companies may qualify if they make available
to the public that information required by Rule 15(C) (2)-11 of
the Exchange Act. 9
Of course those companies having the capacity to meet the
requirements of a qualifying issuer must comply with the appro-
priate reporting requirements. Compliance, however, implies that
the reports filed be accurate and free of material omissions and
misstatements.10 Thus sellers relying upon Rule 144 would be
at the mercy of the issuer's work product. To alleviate this per-
sistent uncertainty, earlier versions of the rule required the Com-
mission to keep a list of qualified issuers. In effect this compila-
tion was tantamount to a representation by the Commission that
the issuers listed therein had fully complied with the reporting re-
quirements.9 1 Consequently sellers could rely with confidence
upon the list, unless a notice of deficiency were issued.
This neat proposal was not adopted, for the reason that it
would unduly burden the administrative tasks of the Commis-
Mundheim and A. Fleischer, eds., 1972). See also SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5243 (April 12, 1972).
86. PLI THnRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON ScURITIES REGULATION 6-7 (R.
Mundheim and A. Fleischer, eds., 1972).
87. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, at 2 (Jan. 11, 1972). See
National Student Marketing Corp. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. f 78,861 (July 19, 1972) where the owner of the shares had
refused to sign a form 144 on the grounds that an exemption from registra-
tion was otherwise available. The Commission warned the owner that
he proceeds "at his own risk."
88. SEC Rule 144(c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (1) (1972).
89. Id. at (c) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (2).
90. PLI THmI ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 24 (R.
Mundheim and A. Fleischer, eds., 1972).
91. W EAT Rae., supra note 4, Appendix VI, at 23.
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Sion. 2 Under the present version of Rule 144, the seller, neverthe-
less, is protected if the issuer has filed the necessary reports "un-
less he [the seller] knows or has reason to believe that the issuer
has not complied with such requirements." 93  Accordingly, the
risk of non-compliance turns upon the application of a subjective
test akin to scienter.
Does the above standard imply a duty to ascertain, within rea-
son, the accuracy of the material filed? It would be dangerous to
answer "no." The basic inquiry, however, should be concerned
with the character of the investigation required to fulfill the duty
and the status of the party involved.
To begin the analysis by the application of the Barchris test
is tempting;9 4 however, its application within this context would
be unwarranted. Because Rule 144 sellers do not necessarily enjoy
official corporate status, the due diligence duty envisioned by
Barchris would pose an impossible burden to non-insiders. More-
over, outsiders are not charged with any special responsibility for
inaccuracies in the registration statement. Only a failure of logic
would impose upon outsiders the duty of affirmative investigation
to determine whether "full"95 compliance has been achieved.
On the other hand, insiders appear under different light.90
For purposes of analysis, insiders could be broken into two further
categories: control party insiders and non-control party insiders.9 7
92. PLI THRm ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 24 (R.
Mundheim and A. Fleischer, eds., 1972).
93. SEC Rule 144(c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (1) (1972). In several
instances the Commission has ruled informally that deficiencies in the
periodic Exchange Act reports do not defeat the availability of Rule 144,
provided the proposed transaction is not a part of a plan to circumvent the
public information requirements of the rule. Electronic Transistors Corp.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FPm. SEC. L. REP. 79,942 (July 31, 1972).
See also Revenue Properties Co. Ltd., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. f 79,235 (Feb. 26, 1973) where Rule 144 would be available
provided the deficiencies were corrected to effect substantial compliance
with section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a).
However, an issuer who has been granted an extension of time to
file its 1934 Act report is not qualified. Tidal Marine International Corp.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,889 (July 17,
1972).
94. Escott v. Barchris Construction Corp., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (The due diligence defenses to civil liability are listed in the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970).
95. The concept of full compliance is considered to be distinct from
mechanical compliance. Full compliance should be able to withstand
Rule lOb-5, SEC Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1970), attacks questioning the accuracy of the reports.
96. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
97. The term "control party insider" admittedly involves a redun-
dancy. See N. LATiN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 320 (1959). While a
It is fundamental that public sales by control parties require regis-
tration 8 Not so the public sales by non-control parties, even
though insiders. However, I contend that insiders who fall short
of the status of control parties should nevertheless be held to a
higher standard than outsiders. Rule 144 requires that a balance
be struck between the responsibility of accurate disclosure and the
purchaser's freedom to resell within reasonable limits.
Accordingly, the following concomitant relationships should
exist: (1) For the control party-no resale possible short of regis-
tration, Rule 144 inapplicable; (2) For the outsider-only a duty to
ascertain whether the requisite reports have been filed (the es-
sential accuracy of these reports is probably indeterminable in
view of the non-insider's limited knowledge of corporate affairs);
(3) For the non-control insider-the availability of Rule 144 de-
pends upon the character of the information which he possesses as
an insider. Obviously the more one knows about the affairs of the
issuer the greater the burden to ascertain the accuracy of the
statements contained in the periodic reports. The test is whether
the insider possesses knowledge, which would lead one to question
the accuracy of the materials filed, necessary to qualify the issuer
under Rule 144.99
Source of Acquisitions: Fungibility
Because Rule 144 is limited to specific types of shareholder
acquisitions, 0 0 i.e. those securities acquired in a transaction or
chain of transactions not involving any public offering, the cir-
cumstances surrounding the acquisition of the securities destined
for resale become an important consideration. Accordingly, the
concept of fungibility must be considered. Its practical effect may
be best explained by this example:
Suppose a purchaser acquires shares through the exchange in
an ordinary trading transaction. Several years later the purchaser
acquires an additional amount of stock in a transaction involving
a private placement. Without registration, the SEC will not per-
mit public resales of the shares acquired from purchases through
the exchange. The Commission's position is based upon the con-
cept of fungibility and it appears that the LIFO method of ac-
countability is being applied. 10 However, if the sequence of the
above acquisitions were reversed, the LIFO method should allow
for the free resale of the stock purchased in a trading transaction
control party is an insider, the obverse does not necessarily follow. See
In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce and Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Act Release
No. 8495 (Nov. 25, 1968).
98. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968).
99. SEC Rule 144(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c)(1) (1972).
100. The term as used in this context is not to be confused with "cor-
porate acquisitions."
101. WHEAT REP., supra note 4, at 172-73. See also PLI TIRD ANNUAL




through the exchange. Predictably the official position of the
Commission is not entirely clear.102
Instead of a private placement being closely allied with an or-
dinary trade, suppose that successive purchase of stock pursu-
ant to the private placement exemption transpired. Fungibility
would apply here in computing the length of the holding period
to be used as evidence of investment intent. But the SEC's posi-
tion cannot be deemed a model of consistency. The staff in its
response to "no-action" letters is guided by subjective criteria
which often boil down to a gut reaction or feeling for a particular
situation. The resultant inconsistencies are most troublesome and
for this reason the Wheat Report proposed the introduction of ob-
jective criteria for this specific problem of fungibility.10'
However, the transition from subjective to objective standards
created more problems than it solved. 04 Rather than retreat to
the old standards, however, the Commission, with an apparent
sense of destiny, boldly abandoned the concept of fungibility.10 5
It now relies solely upon a set of technical rules with specific
applicability to well-known examples.10 6 There is a general fea-
ture, however, prescribing a two year holding period during which
sales are forbidden.0 7 Thereafter it limits the amount of stock
102. WHEAT REP., supra note 4, at 172-73.
103. Id, at 176.
104. PLI THn ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 59-60 (R.
Mundheim and A. Fleischer, eds., 1972).
105. Despite the Commission's announced position, the doctrine of
fungibility still appears to be viable. In Computer Automation Inc.,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,848 (June 9, 1972),
the staff replied to a letter of inquiry as follows:
The concept governing this case is that of fungibility of shares.
Under the fungibility concept, shares of stock (as distinguished
from the certificates evidencing the shares) are considered fungible
in that each share represents the same economic interest in the
issuer .... It is thus questionable whether a purchaser can have
a bona fide investment intent with respect to any particular shares,
if at the time he acquires them, he intends to distribute publicly
other shares of the same issuer. When, therefore, a purchaser
acquires shares from an issuer in a transaction not involving a
public offering, he necessarily indicates an absence of any intent
to distribute to the public any other shares of the same issuer which
he then holds. ....
The practical effect of this as it pertains to the holding period
is that the holding period for all investment securities held is
measured from the time Mr. Smith most recently acquired shares.
This ad hoc resurrection of the fungibility doctrine should be compared to
another informal ruling, Saga Administrative Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,027 (Sept. 25, 1972), which indicated
that a donee holding previously acquired shares and thereafter acquiring
by gift certain other shares is not subject to the Rule 144(e) (3) (c) sales
limitations as to the shares already held.
106. SEC Rule 144 (d) (4), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (4) (1972).
107. Id. at (d) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1).
that can be freely sold to the lesser of, one per cent of the out-




The rule requires that securities shall have been beneficially
owned for at least two years and that the full purchase price or
other consideration shall have been paid or given at least two years
prior to sale if the securities were acquired by purchase.10 9 The
requirement that the economic risks of ownership be assumed by
the seller purports to minimize the opportunity for persons to act
directly or indirectly as conduits for the issuer in connection with
the public resale of unregistered securities.110
In accordance with this policy, the Rule further provides that
giving promissory notes or other obligations toward the payment
of the purchase price or entering into an installment purchase
contract will not satisfy the requirements of full payment. How-
ever, full payment shall be recognized if the foregoing promissory
instruments provide for full recourse against the purchaser of the
securities, or are secured by sufficient collateral covering the fair
market value of the securities, or are fully paid prior to resale. 1
That there is a relationship between full payment and bene-
ficial ownership is undeniable. However, it does not necessarily
follow that beneficial ownership obtains as a result of full pay-
ment. The basic question is whether Rule 144 regards the payment
of full consideration as being merely evidence of beneficial own-
ership or whether the payment of full consideration proves con-
clusively the fact of beneficial ownership. The Rule itself sug-
gests that full payment does not necessarily result in beneficial
ownership. 112 This gives rise to the proposition that suspension of
the holding period may result from those acts which are inconsis-
tent with beneficial ownership. Having thus stated the proposi-
tion, an attempt to define the concept of beneficial ownership
within the context of Rule 144 follows.
The reason for requiring beneficial ownership stems from the
fear that the unscrupulous might be tempted to use Rule 144 as a
device to distribute unregistered stock publicly by using a series
of transfers involving token consideration.11 3 Accordingly, the ba-
sic thrust is directed against conduct inconsistent with investment
intent and the requirement of full consideration is the means used
108. Id. at (e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e).
109. Id. at (d) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1).
110. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, at 8 (Jan. 11, 1972).
111. SEC Rule 144(d) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (2) (1972).
112. Under Rule 144(d) (3) the holding period is suspended when
securities, even though fully paid, are subjected to a short position-an
act inconsistent with investment intent.
113. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
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to control this evil. However, proof of the requirement of bene-
ficial ownership should not necessarily follow from the fact of
full consideration. Therefore, it is contended that beneficial own-
ership is not established by proof of payment of full consideration
if the purchaser engaged in acts which are inconsistent with in-
vestment intent and which have the effect of circumventing the
remedial purposes of the Securities Act.
11 4
Convertible Securities
The final chapter in the controversy concerning the nature of
convertibility within the context of a private placement is stated
quite simply and directly in Rule 144(d) (4) (B). 115 For purposes
of computing the holding period of the security acquired by con-
version, the acquisition date of the underlying security initiates
the period. This simple rule culminates a colorful debate which
started with Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. 116 There the basic is-
sue was whether the private offering exemption would be available
in situations involving the private sale of debentures convertible
into common. The Commission found that the concept of converti-
bility implied that the issuer was considered to be making a con-
tinuing offer of the common stock to any one purchasing the con-
vertible debenture before conversion. In short, the Commission
decided that the holding of the convertible portion is inconsistent
with investment intent. In the words of the Commission:
Purchasing for the purpose of future sale is nonetheless
purchasing for sale and if the transactions involve any
public offering even at some future date, the registration
provisions apply .. '
The Commission's position proved to be the catalyst for a long
term debate between the Commission and the bar concerning the
nature of convertible securities. The two viewpoints-that of the
114. At least on one occasion the Commission has taken an informal
contrary position. In Datapax Computer Systems Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,958 (Aug. 21, 1972), the holding period
was deemed to continue to run in favor of the original purchaser for
shares subsequently transferred in escrow pursuant to a purchase agree-
ment but then returned upon default by the new purchaser.
115. SEC Rule 144(d) (4) (B), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (4) (B) (1972)
reads:
If the securities sold were acquired from the issuer for a considera-
tion consisting solely of other securities of the same issuer sur-
rendered for conversion, the securities so acquired shall be deemed
to have been acquired at the same time as the securities sur-
rendered for conversion ....
116. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No.
3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
117. Id. at 7-8.
Commission and the bar-became known as the two-security and
the package approaches. The two-security approach advanced by
the Commission viewed the convertible security as comprising two
distinct components: the conversion privilege and the underlying
security.11 However, the holder could only hold one security at
any one time. The conversion privilege was considered to be a
continuing offer to the debt holder to convert to an equity holder.
But one could not hold simultaneously in both capacities. While
conceding that the act of conversion would be exempt under Sec-
tion 3(a) (9),119 it did not follow that the security acquired
through conversion would meet the investment intent require-
ment by reference to the holding period of the underlying security.
Indeed, it would be virtually impossible to escape the status of an
underwriter unless the security acquired upon conversion were
held for a sufficient period of time-a highly improbable practice-
undermining the basic character of the convertible security.
The financial bar advanced the package theory.120 Under
this approach the purchaser of a convertible security was deemed
to have acquired a package with a series of rights which were not
necessarily independent. Therefore, if a private purchaser held
the package for a sufficient period of time to establish investment
intent, he should be free to resell any part of the package without
becoming an underwriter. Moreover, the theory continued, Sec-
tion 3 (a) (9) exempted the security obtained upon conversion. Un-
fortunately for the lovers of metaphysics, the above debate has
now ended 121 with the result desired by the financial bar being
embodied in Rule 144(d) (4) (B).
Dividends, Splits, Recapitalizations
In view of the concessions granted to convertible securities, it
should follow a fortiori that, with respect to securities acquired
118. Loss, supra note 1, at 677.
119. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a) (9), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (9) (1970)
provides:
(a) . . , the provisions of this title shall not apply to...
(9) Any security exchanged by the issuer with its existing
security holders exclusively where no commission or other
remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for solicit-
ing such exchange.
120. Loss, supra note 1, at 676.
121. During earlier rounds of this debate, the financial bar found itself
in the loser's corner. Under Rule 155 (rescinded by SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972)), the two-security approach was adopted
over the package theory. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4162 (Dec. 2,
1959) embodies the Commission's former attitude:
It has been generally understood that a conversion is an ex-
change within the meaning of section 3(a) (9), with the result that
the actual transaction of conversion is exempt if the other conditions
of the section are satisfied. It is clear, however, that there is noth-
ing in the intrinsic nature of securities issued in a transaction
falling within section 3(a) (9) which justifies consideration of
such securities as permanently exempt from registration without
regard to any other factors.
A security which is immediately convertible consists of the
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through dividends, splits, and recapitalizations, the holding period
should begin on the acquisition date of the primary security. And
the rule so provides.
122
Contingent Stock
In cases in which stock is being issued as contingent payment
of the purchase price of an equity interest in a business, the hold-
ing period begins on the date that the issuer was committed to
issue the securities subject only to conditions other than the pay-
ment of further consideration for such securities.
123
Pledged Securities
The treatment accorded to securities pledged as collateral and
thereafter publicly sold to liquidate the loan is the product of com-
promise. Without exempting the resale, the rule allows the
pledgee to tack the pledgor's holding period onto his.
12 4
The classic case is SEC v, Guild Filmas Co.125 in which a bank
accepted as collateral certain securities containing legends an-
nouncing its restricted character. The pledged stock was origin-
ally acquired by the pledgor through transactions not involving
any public offering. Thereafter it was publicly sold to liquidate
the loan despite the warning by the Commission that such sales
would impose underwriter status upon the bank. In upholding
the SEC's position, the Second Circuit deemed irrelevant the bank's
contention that it acted in good faith. Thus, the stage was set for
a series of maneuvers by the banks to soften the effect of the
convertible security and a right to acquire the underlying security,
thus involving a continuous offering by the issuer of the underlying
security. A purchaser of the convertible security acquires it and
the right and no more. If he offers to sell the convertible security,
he offers to sell the right, thus transferring the issuer's offer of
the underlying security, originally limited to the persons to whom
the convertible security was initially offered, into an offer to all
persons to whom the convertible security is now offered. The
issuer's offer of the underlying security terminates upon exercise
or expiration of the right. At any one time a person can own only
one security or the other; he can never own both. Consequently,
it cannot be said that a purchaser of the convertible security in-
cludes a simultaneous purchase of the underlying security. In the
case of a debenture convertible into an equity security, the pur-
chaser remains a creditor until he chooses to become an owner of
the equity security; the two interests never merge. The transac-
tion of conversion is an exchange for value and, therefore, a sale
under the Securities Act and under accepted commercial practice
and understanding.
122. SEC Rule 144(d) (4) (A), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (d) (4) (A) (1972).
123. Id. at (d) (4) (C), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (4) (C).
124. Id. at (d) (4) (D), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (4) (D).
125. 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960).
Guild Films case. One such assault occurred during the rule-mak-
ing process leading to Rule 154, but the SEC stood firm, citing the
authority of the Guild Films case.1 2  However, the inflexibility of
the Commission's position soon drew fire from other quarters.
Professor Loss called for a return to the concept of the bona fide
pledge;127 the Wheat Report agreed, 28 but apparently not en-
tirely.1 29 All other conditions of Rule 144 must be met before the
pledgee is free to sell. There is, however, limited relief embodied
in the tacking prerogatives which allow tacking between pledgee
and pledgor after default of the obligation secured by the
pledge.130  But a strand of fungibility remains. Sales by the
pledgee shall be aggregated with those sales by the pledgor for
the purpose of determining whether the amount of securities sold
falls within the one per cent allowable.' 3 '
This latter rule concerning aggregation raises a baffling ques-
tion. Suppose that a portion of stock acquired privately and held
for over two years is pledged and a portion retained. Thereafter
default occurs. It appears that the bank and the pledgor are free
to sell provided both sales are aggregated and the amounts do not
exceed the percentage limitations. However, can it be said that the
dual sales activity detracts from the requirement that the pledge
be bona fide? Without more evidence the answer is difficult and
generally the bank should be able to justify its own immediate
sales activity to cover its financial position. Moreover, it seems
incongruous that the rule would permit dual sales activity of un-
registered stock (within limits, of course). Even if the bank is
acting in good faith, the fact that a defaulting pledgor is allowed
Rule 144 privileges strains credulity. 32 It is enough that the bank
be given a qualified respite; Rule 144 should not provide a refuge
for such sales by a defaulting pledgor.
Donative Transactions
The application of the Rule to acquisitions from gifts, estates
or trusts involves an interplay between the "tacking" rules and the
"aggregation" rules. In short, tacking from donor to donee is gen-
erally allowed, but the effect of this generosity is tempered by
certain rules requiring aggregation in specific instances. 3 3
126. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 21, 1966).
127. Loss, supra note 1, at 645.
128. WHEAT REP., supra note 4, at 240.
129. The concept of bona fide pledge as embodied in Rule 144 (d) (4) (D)
is accepted only if the other requirements of Rule 144 are met. For
example, a bona fide pledge to a non-qualified issuer would not fall
within the purview of Rule 144.
130. SEC Rule 144(d) (4) (D), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (4) (D) (1972).
131. Id. at (c) (3) (B); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (3) (B).
132. This assumes that the consideration obtained by the pledgor from
the sale of his unpledged stock, is not being used to fulfill his obligation
to the pledgee.





If securities are acquired through gift, the donee may tack the
donor's holding period onto his.13 4 However, for purposes of com-
puting the percentage limitation, the donor's and donee's sales are
aggregated. 88
TrIsts
Tacking is permitted between the settlor and the trust itself,
and between the trust and beneficiary. 186 It is unclear whether
double tacking, i.e. from settlor to trust to beneficiary, is allowed.
There appears to be no reason that it should be disallowed. As
in the case of gifts, aggregation between the parties is required.
13 7
Estates
An estate or a beneficiary can adopt the deceased's date of ac-
quisition as its own.138 Moreover, the two-year holding period re-
quirement is suspended if neither the estate nor the beneficiary is
an affiliate of the issuer.189 This is a major concession and will
help to facilitate the expeditious disposition of probate proceed-
ings. However, the suspension of the two-year holding period does
not amount to a complete waiver of the other requirements of
Rule 144. There is a second major waiver of the amount limita-
tions requirement provided the estate or beneficiary is not an af-
filiate of the issuer.140 Thus, in cases involving nonaffiliate status,
the concept of change of circumstances seems to have been resur-
rected for a limited purpose.'
41
134. Id. at (d) (4) (E), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (4) (E).
135. Id. at (e) (3) (C), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (3) (C).
136. Id. at (d) (4) (F), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (4) (F). Profit sharing
trusts are not included in this category; the holding period does not relate
back to the date of acquisition of shares by the trust. International Flavors
& Fragrances, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Ssc. L. REP.
79,216 (Jan. 3, 1973).
137. SEC Rule 144(e) (3) (D), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (3) (D).
138. Id. at (d) (4) (G), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (4) (G). An informal rul-
ing holds that options to purchase stock passing to the estate, when exer-
cised, start a new holding period with no tacking allowed. Mircoform Data
System, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 78,916
(July 20, 1972).
139. SEC Rule 144(c) (3) (E), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c) (3) (E).
140. Id.
141. On the other hand, affiliate status with respect to the issue triggers
the aggregation rules. SEC Rule 144(e) (1) (A) & (B), 17 C.F.R. §
230.144(e) (1) (A) & (B) (1972).
V. CONCLUSION
The Commission's decision to introduce objective criteria to
facilitate the practical administration of the private offering ex-
emption has been stimulated no doubt by the flurry of activity
surrounding its recently departed Chairman Casey. Now the fate
of the private offering rests with Rule 144 and proposed Rule 146.
Rule 144, a daring venture by SEC standards, is currently present-
ing special problems of interpretation to both the Commission and
the bar. Its uniqueness no doubt will continue to create adminis-
trative burdens.
Proposed Rule 146, on the other hand, being less revolutionary,
should not generate as many administrative burdens. It is akin to
a restatement of the case law, but it does extend the rationale of
several of the basic precedents. If anything, such extension tends
to promote the aim of the Securities Act and could only help to
improve the integrity of the investment atmosphere. Although
Rule 144 was meant to lay to rest the uncertainty surrounding the
application of the private offering exemption, ironically the vol-
ume of informal rulings issued with respect to this exemption is
running extremely high.
While the impetus toward objective standards is welcomed as
an administrative respite, the effect of the new rules creates a spe-
cific problem which should not be overlooked. The environment
which once supported the essential judicial stimulus which caused
the law of the non-public offering to grow and develop has become
rigid. And those well-developed forces shaping the growth and
texture of the non-public offering struggle for survival. In such
instances it is usual for petrification to develop and a body of
quaint and exhaustively mechanical rules to emerge. Although it
cannot be denied that the non-public offering did indeed possess
potential to trap the unwary, the new scheme of objective criteria
will surely trap those less mechanically inclined.
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